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1 Introduction
The Issues at hand. New technologies and innovative service providers often challenge
the provision of traditional services. One of the most striking examples is the advent of
mobile telephony, and its impact on xed telephony services. Only three decades ago,
xed-line operators fullled all communications needs over their networks, but in the last
20 years mobile telephony has signicantly altered the historical market structure. All
over the world, wireless services have recorded substantial growth in terms of subscriber-
ship, revenues, and usage, and despite the recent economic crisis, the number of mobile
subscribers has continued to grow.
Much of the success of the mobile sector is due to xed-mobile substitution. Major
technological advances and cost reductions have enabled mobile carriers to decrease the
di¤erence between xed and mobile prices, allowing them to become strong competitors
to traditional xed providers. At the same time, the xed and mobile markets have
been subject to regulatory intervention, but to di¤erent degrees: While xed telephony
operators retail and wholesale prices (i.e., the "mobile termination rates" charged to
other operators for receiving their calls) tended to be strongly regulated at cost, for
mobile operators only termination rates were eventually regulated, and until recently at
values far above marginal cost.
Empirical studies have attempted to quantify xed-mobile substitution (see, for ex-
ample, the survey by Vogelsang (2010), as well as the following section), but there is a
lack of theoretical investigation about the e¤ect of consumerspreference for mobility on
xed-mobile substitution. This paper tries to ll this gap. Clearly, there is a variety of
factors that could be considered as potential causes of xed-mobile substitution, and none
on its own provides a su¢ cient explanation. This paper focuses on the role of asymmetric
regulation of termination rates on xed and mobile networks as a contributing factor.
The paper presents a model with three independent but interconnected operators,
one xed and two mobile networks. The key novelty is the construction of the demand
side. All subscribers spend the same fraction of their time outside home, but depending
on their personal preference for mobile telephony, they choose whether to subscribe to
a xed or a mobile network, or to both. Di¤erently from the previous literature, this
paper considers the only realistic case, where mobile-only, xed-only and "xed-mobile"
customers are all simultaneously present in market equilibrium. This framework is in line
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with recent evidence from the market. The association of European Telecom Regulators
(BEREC, 2011) reported that although the share of mobile-only households increased and
that of xed-only households decreased over time, having both is now the most common
situation in Europe (62% of households, on average) and that this share is not declining
over time.1
The model set out below shows that the possibility of call and access substitution can
a¤ect call pricing if subscribers are heterogeneous and rms want to price discriminate.
More specically, when mobile termination rates are relatively high, mobile-to-xed prices
are distorted downward from marginal cost, while when mobile termination rates are rela-
tively low (almost at cost) both mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-xed calls are downward
distorted. Since mobile-only customers both make and receive more calls on their mobile
phones than those that hold both a xed and a mobile subscription, while both types of
consumers are equally a¤ected by the level of xed fees, a usage-discriminating "waterbed
e¤ect" arises that transmits termination prots via discounts in call prices.
The main aim of this paper, though, is to analyze the impact of varying levels of
termination rates on consumerssubscription decisions. The key question is whether the
di¤erent regulatory treatment of termination on xed and mobile networks a¤ects the
development of xed and mobile subscription decisions. Numerical simulations based on
the model show that each (xed or mobile) termination rate has a positive e¤ect on the
take-up of the corresponding service, via the waterbed e¤ect, and lowers subscriptions to
the other service, via a cost e¤ect. Moreover, because of the same e¤ect higher termination
rates increase the number of consumers who do not subscribe to any service.
Finally, the socially optimal combination of termination rates is analyzed: Fixed
termination rates should be set at cost, and mobile termination rates above cost. The
interests of mobile operators and di¤erent consumer groups are not coincident, though.
Both mobile operators and mobile-only consumers prefer a xed termination rate at cost,
while users with both xed and mobile phones and xed-only consumers prefer a higher
level. On the other hand, consumers prefer a level of mobile termination rate at or below
1Based on the 2011 E-communications household survey, the number of households having at least
one mobile subscription is rather high and homogeneous from 82% to 96% (with an average of 89%) 
across Europe. On the other hand, xed-line penetration is extremely heterogeneous: It is very high in
countries such as Sweden (98%), the Netherlands (89%) and France (87%), whereas only 17% of Czech
households are connected. Mobile-only households range from 2% to 81%, while the share of xed-mobile
users range from 15% to 94%.
3
the social optimum, while mobile operators would like to set this rate at a higher level.
Summing up, the model implies that high mobile and low xed termination rates can
lead to an additional shift of subscriptions from xed to mobile networks. Furthermore,
taking account of the social benet from mobility, this structure of termination rates
tended to be socially optimal, while regulation of termination rates as such was also
justied.
Literature Review. There exists a sizeable economic literature on the relationship
between xed and mobile telephony, and on the role of xed-to-mobile termination rates.
Wright (2002) considers xed-to-mobile calls with a focus on mobile termination rates,
while others (e.g., Valletti and Houpis, 2005) analyze how socially optimal mobile termina-
tion rates depend on the magnitude of network externalities, the intensity of competition
in the mobile sector, and the distribution of customer preferences. These papers however
do not consider the role of xed-mobile substitution (both at access and service level),
and more importantly, they do not take into account consumer heterogeneity with respect
to the benets from mobility, as done in this paper.
Armstrong and Wright (2009), Baake and Mitusch (2009) and Hausman (2012) ana-
lyze the role of call substitution and discuss voluntary vs. regulated setting of termination
rates. These authors show that substitution between xed- and mobile-originated calls
weakens the competitive bottleneck of call termination, and brings the termination rates
that rms would choose closer to the e¢ cient level while remaining above cost. Hence,
the welfare gains from regulating mobile termination rates are smaller, while private in-
centives do not imply excessively high levels. This paper departs from previous studies
by analyzing the more realistic situation where substitution a¤ects not only the types of
calls made but also consumersaccess decisions. Moreover, the current model highlights
how subscription decisions and welfare are a¤ected by both mobile and xed termination
rates.
Closest to this paper is Hansen (2006), who also investigates xed-mobile access sub-
stitution in a model with competition in the mobile market and subscribers with varying
mobility benets. Contrary to the present analysis, though, in his model the hetero-
geneity in the preference for mobility does not a¤ect the types of calls that consumers
make. By contrast, this paper assumes that when a consumer is on the road, he cannot
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make xed calls. Moreover, Hansen does not analyze the most realistic and thus most
practically relevant market structure that this paper focuses on, with the simultaneous
presence of mobile-only, xed-only, and xed-mobile subscribers. User mobility is also
present in Valletti (2003), but in a model with mobile-only consumers moving between
urban and rural areas while obtaining access to mobile services conditional on the mobile
operatorscoverage.
Though applied to a di¤erent setting, the game-theoretic structure of this paper is
similar to the one developed by de Bijl and Peitz (2009), who analyze the e¤ect of access
and retail price regulation on the adoption of voice over IP telephony. In their model, as
in this analysis, consumers rst choose which technology to adopt. Firms then compete
in their respective markets, given these adoption decisions.
On the policy side, Bomsel et al. (2003) study the impact of xed and mobile termi-
nation rates on xed-to-mobile or mobile-to-xed tra¢ c. The authors estimate that the
transfer from xed networks and their customers, as a result of high mobile termination
rates, has amounted to 19 billion Euros in France, Germany and the UK over 1998 to
2002. According to these authors, this transfer harmed xed customers and operators,
probably damaged competition in the xed market, and distorted competition between
xed and mobile operators. The present theoretical analysis conrms that higher mobile
termination rates are likely to have increased the adoption of mobile telephony and to
have reduced xed access, but also highlights that this termination rate structure is likely
to have increased social welfare when the benets from mobility are accounted for.
The current paper is theoretical, but it is important to review also the relevant em-
pirical evidence on xed-mobile substitution (see the surveys by Woroch, 2002, and Vo-
gelsang, 2010). The evidence for xed-mobile substitution is rather mixed but suggests
that call and access substitution are increasing over time. For example, Rodini et al.
(2003), using data from the US, show that householdssubscriptions to second xed lines
and mobile services are access substitutes, while Ward and Woroch (2005, 2010) nd
substantial substitutability between xed and mobile subscriptions. Some recent studies
provide stronger evidence on xed-mobile call substitution. Briglauer et al. (2011) nd
for Austria that xed and mobile calls are strong substitutes while access substitution
is rather weak. Ward and Zheng (2012), using panel data from China, nd that xed
and mobile telephony services have become fairly strong substitutes for both usage and
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subscriptions. Barth and Heimesho¤ (2012a,b), using panel data on EU27 countries,
show modest substitution e¤ects on xed and mobile subscriptions, while the estimated
cross-price elasticity of the mobile price on xed line call demand is relatively large com-
pared to previous studies. Grzybowski (2012) analyzes substitution between access to
xed-line and mobile telephony in the European Union. He nds that decreasing prices
for mobile services increases the share of mobile-only households and decreases the share
of xed-only and xed-mobile households, which suggests substitution between xed-line
and mobile connections. Finally, Grzybowski and Verboven (2013) also analyze the sub-
stitution between xed-line and mobile telecommunications services. The authors show
that xed and mobile connections are generally perceived in the EU as substitutes, espe-
cially in regions with a higher GDP per capita, but also that there is much heterogeneity
across countries due to the interplay of specic social and economic features (i.e., house-
holds with di¤erent age, education, professional activity, etc.). Moreover, the authors
show that from the rmspoint of view there is strong complementarity between xed-
line and mobile connections, enabling incumbents to leverage their strong position in the
xed-line market into the mobile market.
Note that none of these empirical studies presents evidence on the impact of xed and
mobile termination rates on consumerssubscription decisions. Hence, this paper also
provides new testable predictions for future empirical work on xed-mobile substitution.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 the model is presented, and the
equilibrium retail tari¤s of mobile and xed operators is found. In Section 3 the e¤ect
of xed and mobile termination rates on subscription decisions and welfare is analyzed.
Finally, in Section 4 conclusions are reported. Proofs can be found in the Appendix.
2 Model and Pricing Equilibrium
2.1 Setup
Consumers and rms. There are three rms: two mobile networks and one monopoly
xed network.2 The xed network is regulated; its call prices are set by the regulator at
marginal costs, and its total prots are equal to zero.
2The xed network is independent of the mobile networks, that is, xed-mobile integration is not
considered. See Hoernig et al. (2014) for an analysis of this issue.
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Consumers, whose total mass is xed at 1, can subscribe to a mobile network and/or
to the xed network. According to their network choice, they are denoted mobile-only
(M), xed-only (F), and xed-mobile (FM) subscribers. Consumers spend a fraction of
their time  2 (0; 1) outside home. When they are on the move, which happens with
probability , consumers can only use their mobile phones to make or receive calls. When
they are at home, which happens with probability 1 , consumers have access to a xed
and/or a mobile phone; if they have both, they choose whichever is cheaper to make calls.
Calling patterns are balanced, and consumers are on the move or at home indepen-
dently of each other.3 They are heterogenous in their relative benets from mobility and,
independently, in their preferences for the two mobile networks, as specied below.
It is further assumed that when consumers choose which network(s) to join, they know
their benets from mobility, but do not yet know their network preference. For example,
consumers may rst decide whether or not to have a mobile phone and which one (e.g.,
an iPhone or an Android phone), and only afterwards decide which mobile operator to
subscribe to.4
Mobile network is numbers of M- and FM-clients are mi and 
mx
i , respectively, for
i = 1; 2. Its total number of subscribers is then i = 
m
i +
mx
i . The total numbers of M-
and FM-clients are m = m1 + 
m
2 and 
mx = mx1 + 
mx
2 , respectively, the total number
of mobile subscribers is  = m + mx, and there are x xed clients. Consumers and
rms are assumed to have rational expectations about the number of subscribers for each
network technology (m, mx and x). That is, they take these as given when they make
their subscription and tari¤ decisions, but their value must be consistent ex post with
equilibrium tari¤s and subscriber numbers.5 On the other hand, rms take into account
that their market shares mi and 
mx
i are a¤ected directly by tari¤ decisions.
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Finally, mobile networks incur a xed cost f per subscriber, marginal costs of origina-
tion and termination co and ct, and on-net costs c = co+ct. The mobile termination rate,
3Intertemporal substitution, i.e. the possibility for consumers that are on the road to postpone calls
until they arrive at home, is ignored.
4This timing assumption leads to simpler expressions for market shares and keeps the analysis tech-
nically feasible.
5Thus the determination of customer segments corresponds to the "passive belief" approach suggested
by Hurkens and Lopez (2014).
6A model where m, mx and x vary with out-of-equilibrium tari¤s (rather than only equilibrium
tari¤s) has been also analyzed by the authors. The results are qualitatively similar though mathematically
much more complicated.
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applied regardless of whether calls originate from a mobile or a xed network, is a  ct.
Denote by n = a  ct the termination mark-up. Similarly, the xed network has a xed
cost per subscriber fx, marginal costs cxo < co and cxt < ct, on-net costs cx = cxo + cxt,
and a termination rate ax  cxt with mark-up nx = ax cxt. Given that xed termination
rates tend to be regulated close to cost, it is assumed throughout that ax < ct.
For now, the following assumption regarding the marginal costs of calls is made:
Assumption 1: The marginal costs of calls, including termination rates, are ordered
as follows:
cx < co + ax < co +
ct + a
2
< cxo + a. (1)
Given that marginal costs and termination rates on xed networks tend to be far be-
low those of mobile networks, the only actually restrictive assumption is the right-
most inequality. It states that the mobile termination rate is so high that xed-to-
mobile calls have higher perceived marginal costs than mobile-to-mobile calls, that is,
a > a  ct + 2 (co   cxo). This assumption describes an initial phase of development of
mobile markets, where mobile termination rates are much higher than xed termination
rates. For example, a recent report by BEREC (2013) shows that the average termina-
tion rate in the EU27 in January 2013 was equal to 2.58ecents/minute, while the average
xed termination rate ranged between 0.50 and 0.80ecents/minute according to the level
(Layer) of interconnection. Hence, termination on mobile networks is still at least three
times more expensive than on xed networks.
However, in many EU countries termination rates are still being cut considerably by
national regulators. This implies that in the medium-term termination rates will approach
marginal cost (i.e., n ! 0). Hence, the ordering of marginal costs of calls may change.
Therefore, the case of very low mobile termination rates is also considered below.
Tari¤s and surplus. Mobile network i charges a tari¤ (Fi; pi; pix), where Fi is a
monthly xed fee, and pi and pix are the mobile-to-mobile and mobile-to-xed per-minute
call prices.7 Similarly, the xed network o¤ers a tari¤ (Fx; px; pxm), where Fx is its
monthly xed fee, px its on-net price, and pxm the xed-to-mobile per-minute call price.
It is postulated (and conrmed in the simulations below), that the following ordering of
7In order to focus on the e¤ects of interconnection between xed and mobile networks, a uniform
mobile-to-mobile call price is assumed, ruling out di¤erent prices for on-net and o¤-net calls.
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prices holds:
px < pix < pi < pxm. (2)
Note that due to assumption (1), condition (2) holds when equilibrium prices are equal
or close to their respective marginal cost.
The consumption utility from a call of length q is u(q), where u0 > 0 and u00 < 0.
For k 2 fx; ix; i; xmg, the callers indirect utility is vk = v (pk) = maxq u(q)   pkq, and
the call duration is qk =  v0 (pk). Apart from the surplus obtained from making calls,
subscribers obtain an access surplus that depends on the network(s) they subscribe to. If
a consumer subscribes only to a mobile network or to the xed network, his subscription
surplus is Am or Ax, respectively. If he subscribes to both types of networks, he obtain
an access surplus of Amx.
When an FM-subscriber of network i is on the move, the order of prices (2) implies
that it is cheaper for him to make mobile-to-xed calls than mobile-to-mobile calls when
receivers are at home (pix < pi). Thus, mobile-to-mobile calls are only made when
receivers are themselves on the move.8 When at home, the same subscriber can use
either his xed phone or his mobile phone. From (2), he uses his xed phone to call other
people at home (px < pix), and his mobile phone to call people on the move (pi < pxm).
The expected surplus of subscribing both to the xed network and to mobile network i
is thus given by
wmxi = Amx   Fi   Fx + mvi + x [vix + (1  ) vx] , (3)
where m = m + mx denotes the number of receivers on mobile phones, i.e. all
M-subscribers plus FM-subscribers when the latter are on the move. Equally, x =
(1  ) (mx + x) describes the number of receivers on xed phones, which are all F-
and FM-subscribers if and only if they are at home.
The surplus (3) is equal to the access surplus minus the xed fees, plus the surplus of
calling M-subscribers and FM-subscribers on the move, plus the surplus of calling FM-
and F-subscribers when they are at home, either from the road with probability  or
from home with probability 1 . At home, there is substitution to cheaper xed on-net
8This assumption describes the procedure in which the caller rst calls the receivers xed line and
then calls him on his mobile if he does not nd him at home.
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calls to reach xed phones and to cheaper mobile-to-mobile calls to reach mobile phones
(xed-to-mobile calls are never used by FM-subscribers).
A mobile-only user makes all calls with his mobile phone, and obtains the surplus
wmi = Am   Fi + mvi + xvix. (4)
Similarly, a xed-only user makes all calls from his xed line, and receives the surplus
wx = Ax   Fx + (1  ) (mvxm + xvx) . (5)
Note that xed-only users are the only group of consumers that makes xed-to-mobile
calls.
Subscription decisions and market shares. As already mentioned, consumers di¤er
in their preferences for mobile networks. They learn these preferences after deciding to
take out a mobile subscription, but before choosing a specic mobile network. The former
decision is based on the expected surplus of having a mobile subscription, while the latter
decision is taken after comparing actual tari¤s and takes into account the preference for
one or the other network.
For given tari¤s (Fi; pi; pix) and resulting surpluses wmi and w
mx
i , and j 6= i, mobile
operator is market shares of M- and FM-subscribers are assumed to be
mi = y
 
wmi   wmj

m, and mxi = y
 
wmxi   wmxj

mx,
respectively, where y is a function y : R! [0; 1], with y (0) = 1=2, y0 > 0 and y0 (0) =
 > 0. An often-used special case is the Hotelling model, which over the relevant range
corresponds to y (x) = 1=2 + x.
Consumers are assumed to correctly anticipate that the mobile market equilibrium will
be symmetric; they therefore expect to subscribe to each mobile network with probability
1=2. Ex post, consumers choose the mobile network that is closer to their taste. Denoting
by  > 0 the expected disutility from not obtaining a perfect match in their operator
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choice,9 subscribers expect surplus wx on the xed network, and
wm =
1
2
(wm1 + w
m
2 )  , and wmx =
1
2
(wmx1 + w
mx
2 )  .
Since consumers have rational expectations, in equilibrium it is imposed that wk = wk,
for k 2 fm;mx; xg, that is, the expected surpluses must be equal to the realized ones.
Consumer heterogeneity is captured in the benets from mobility with the following
assumption: The utility of consumer l from taking subscription decision k 2 fm;mx; xg
is dened by the linear random utility model
Ulk = w
k + "lk,
where "lk is a random term.10 The number of consumers in each segment k 2 fm;mx; xg
is then given by an expression
k = Pk ( w
m; wmx; wx) , (6)
where Pk is the probability of choice k, @Pk=@ wk > 0, @Pk=@ wl  0 for l 6= k, and
Pm + Pmx + Px  1.
Prots. The number of customers of mobile network i = 1; 2 without access to a xed
phone is mi = 
m
i + 
mx
i , and its prots are given by (j 6= i)
i = i

Fi   f +

m (pi   c)  mj n

qi
	
+mi 
x (pix   co   ax) qix (7)
+mi n

jqj + (1  )xqxm

.
The rst line of equation (7) gives the prots due to xed fees and calls to other mobile
users, the second line the prots from calls to the xed network, and the last line those
from termination.
9For the Hotelling framework, we have  = 2
R 1=2
0
x= (2) dx = 1=(8).
10The distribution of "lk is not relevant for the determination of equilibrium tari¤s. In our simulations
below we assume a logit choice model. The value of any potential outside option is normalized to zero.
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For the xed network, prots are
x = (
x + mx) (Fx   fx) + (x)2 (px   cx) qx
+ (1  )xm (pxm   cxo   a) qxm (8)
+xnx (
m
1 q1x + 
m
2 q2x) .
Again, subscription prots are on the rst line, together with prots from on-net calls.
Prots from calls to mobiles are on the second line, and termination prots are on the
last line.
Expected consumer surplus is given by an expression that depends on expected sur-
pluses and the discrete choice model for customer segments,
CS = S ( wm; wmx; wx) ,
and total welfare is
W = CS + 1 + 2 + x. (9)
Let,us now recall the sequence of events. In a rst stage, consumers decide which
technology to adopt (F, M, or FM). Then, mobile operators set their retail tari¤s. Third,
consumers learn their xed benets from mobility, and the consumers who adopted the
mobile technology choose their mobile operator. Fourth, and nally, consumers make call
decisions. The solution concept adopted is subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Consumersdecisions at Stage 3 and 4 have already been determined. The following
analysis starts with Stage 2 where mobile operators set their retail tari¤s.
2.2 Equilibrium Tari¤s
The symmetric equilibrium in the mobile market is found by solving mobile networks
prot-maximization problems, taking the segmentation of customers in F-, FM- and M-
subscribers as given. On the other hand, the standard procedure of maximizing networks
prots over call prices, while holding the number of each networks subscribers constant,
fails because of composition e¤ects: Mobile-to-xed prices enter mi and 
mx
i with
di¤erent relative weights. Thus, adjusting the xed fee Fi to hold, say, mi constant after
a change in pix, does not annul the changes in mxi . The correct procedure, as applied
12
in the proof of the following result, is to maximize simultaneously over the whole tari¤
(Fi; pi; pix).
Proposition 1 Under Assumption 1, symmetric mobile equilibrium tari¤s are given by:
1. A mobile-to-mobile call price equal to average marginal cost,
pi = c+
n
2
; (10)
2. a mobile-to-xed call price at or below marginal cost,
pix = co + ax + n (qix=q
0
ix) 

high; (11)
where

high =
qi + (1  )xqxm
1= (2)  xq2ix=q0ix
;  =
m + 2mx
m
  
m

> 0;
3. xed fees equal to
F i = f +
1
2

1  n
m
high


+
m
2
nqi:
4. Equilibrium prots are
i =

4
:
Prots i and mobile-to-mobile call prices p

i have the standard form for uniform
tari¤s in the Hotelling model, that is, they are equal to the "transport cost" 1=2 times
the subscriber number, and perceived average marginal cost, respectively (Armstrong,
1998; La¤ont, Rey and Tirole, 1998a).
The mobile-to-xed call price pix is set below marginal cost if n > 0. This pricing
structure arises because mobile-only customers both make more mobile-to-xed calls and
receive more incoming calls. Thus, when the mobile termination rate is above cost these
customers bring in higher termination prots. Competition then transforms the latter into
a discount on the service that mobile-only customers use more than other customers, that
is, mobile-to-xed calls. This is borne out by the fact that the distortion in pix disappears
when the mobile termination rate is set at cost, i.e., a = ct. Thus, the combination of call
substitution and customer heterogeneity gives rise to a distorted usage pricing structure.
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For the regulated monopoly xed network, cost-based call pricing and the zero-prot
constraint imply, given the symmetric equilibrium in the mobile market, that
px = cx, p

xm = cxo + a, and F

x = fx   (1  )nxmqix. (12)
2.3 Equilibrium Tari¤s when Mobile Termination Rates are (al-
most) at Cost
Suppose now that the mobile termination rate is low, i.e., a  a: The ranking of marginal
cost changes to:
Assumption 2: The marginal costs of calls are ordered as follows:
cx < co + ax; cxo + a  co + ct + a
2
: (13)
Under this assumption, the relevant ordering of prices becomes:
px < pix < pi; px < pxm < pi:
That is, xed-to-mobile calls become cheaper than mobile-to-mobile calls.11
While mobile-only and xed-only userssurplus remains unchanged, FM-users now
can call mobiles from home at a cheaper price. Therefore, their surplus changes to:
wmxi = Amx   Fi   Fx + m [vi + (1  ) vxm] + x [vix + (1  ) vx] ,
that is, they substitute away from mobile calls whenever possible and mobile-to-mobile
calls only have weight .
The corresponding prots become:
i = i fFi   fg+ mi

m (pi   c)  mj n

qi
+mi 
x (pix   co   ax) qix + mi n

mj qj + 
xqxm

:
Compared to (7), the weights of mobile-to-mobile incoming and outgoing calls has de-
11On the other hand, the relative ranking of pix and pxm is irrelevant; when a customer is at home
and contemplates making a xed-to-mobile call then he also has xed-to-xed calls at price px < pix at
his disposal and thus will not be using his mobile phone in any case.
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creased, while now there are more incoming xed-to-mobile calls. Following the same
approach as in the proof of Proposition 1, the following result is found:12
Proposition 2 Under Assumption 2, symmetric mobile equilibrium tari¤s are given by:
1. a mobile-to-mobile call price at or below marginal cost,
pi = c+
n
2
+ n (qi=q
0
i) 

low; (14)
2. a mobile-to-xed call price at or below marginal cost,
pix = co + ax + n (qix=q
0
ix) 

low; (15)
where

low =
mqi=2 + 
xqxm
1= (2)  mq2i =q0i   xq2ix=q0ix
;
3. xed fees equal to
F i = f +
1
2

1  n
m
low


:
4. Equilibrium prots are
i =

4
. (16)
Proposition 2 presents an interesting novelty as compared to Proposition 1. Recall
that in the previous case the presence of a high termination rate leads to expensive
xed-to-mobile calls, i.e., pxm > pi. In this case there is no distortion in the mobile-
to-mobile price pi because both M-only and FM-customers make the same number of
mobile-to-mobile calls. When instead the mobile termination rate is low, xed-to-mobile
calls become cheaper than mobile-to-mobile calls, i.e., pxm < pi. In this case, the price
of mobile-to-mobile calls, pi, is downward distorted because FM-customers substitute
away from these calls when they are at home. Thus, rms use both mobile-to-xed and
mobile-to-mobile calls to price discriminate.
Finally, the call prices and xed fee on the xed network are the same as above: In
particular, the xed fee does not change since call prices are set at cost and therefore
12For reason of space the proof of this Proposition is not reported. It is available from the authors
upon request.
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even though the number of calls on the xed network has increased this has no e¤ect on
prots.
3 Simulation Results
3.1 The E¤ects of Termination Rates on Subscriptions
This section studies the e¤ect of xed and mobile termination rates on subscription
decisions. In particular, the question is whether higher termination rates raise or lower
the number of subscribers for each network technology, and whether there are cross-e¤ects.
Due to the complex expressions for the equilibrium xed fees and mobile-to-xed prices,
and independently of the actual subscription demand model (6), numerical simulations
must be performed.
In the following, a logit subscription demand model is adopted. Denote the outside
option of not buying any subscription as k = o, with consumer number o = 1   x  
mx   m, surplus wo = 0 and the set of options K = fo;m;mx; xg. Then, the sizes of
customer segments are given by
k =
exp
 
b wk
P
l2K exp (b w
l)
; k 2 K:
Here, b > 0 measures the degree of heterogeneity in subscribers tastes for the di¤er-
ent types of subscriptions. The corresponding measure of consumer surplus is CS =
ln
 P
k2K exp
 
b wk

=b. It is further assumed that consumer mobility is  = 0:5; mobile
market di¤erentiation is  = 1; call demand is q (p) = 5 (1  p), and marginal costs are
co = ct = 0:1, cxo = cxt = 0:01. Fixed costs f , fx and Ax are normalized to zero, and
Am = Amx = 1. Varying the termination rates cxt  ax < ct and a  ct (with a change
in substitution pattern at a = a = 0:28 as explained above),13 one can determine how
the number of xed and mobile subscribers changes depending on the levels of xed and
mobile termination rates.14
Table 1 reports the results from simulating equilibrium subscriber shares. For di¤erent
13All the following results correspond to the "high termination rate case" for a  a (including the
border case at a = 0:28), and the "low termination rate case" for a < a.
14The simulations have been run under other demand models and parameter congurations, with
qualitatively similar results.
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combinations of mobile and xed termination rates a and ax, it reports the total numbers
of mobile (m + mx) and xed (x + mx) subscribers, as well the number of those who
do not subscribe to any o¤er (o).
Total Mobile Total xed Non-subscribers
anax 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10
0.10 80.3% 79.5% 78.6% 57.7% 59.7% 61.4% 5.6% 5.6% 5.7%
0.19 81.8% 81.0% 80.2% 55.1% 57.2% 59.1% 5.6% 5.6% 5.6%
0.28 81.9% 81.2% 80.4% 53.3% 55.6% 57.6% 6.0% 6.0% 6.0%
0.37 82.7% 82.0% 81.2% 52.3% 54.7% 56.8% 6.1% 6.0% 6.0%
0.46 83.1% 82.4% 81.7% 51.6% 54.0% 56.2% 6.3% 6.2% 6.2%
Table 1: E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and xed (ax) termination rates on the
shares of mobile, xed and non-subscribing customers.
Two main results are obtained. First, a higher xed (resp., mobile) termination rate
increases the total number of xed (resp., mobile) subscribers. This is by virtue of the
waterbed e¤ect: Higher prots from the termination of cross-network calls are handed on
to consumers through lower subscription fees. These lower subscription fees then increase
the take-up of the respective service. On the other hand, increasing a termination rate
decreases the total number of subscribers on the other network. For example, increasing
the mobile termination rate makes some consumers drop their xed connection and opt
for only having a mobile one. This e¤ect occurs because setting a higher mobile termi-
nation rate increases the price of xed-to-mobile calls (via a "cost e¤ect"), which makes
keeping a xed connection less attractive. These simulation results suggest that the reg-
ulatory policy in e¤ect during the last decade increased xed-mobile access substitution
via two separate channels: The conjunction of higher mobile termination rates and low
xed termination rates both stimulated the take-up of mobile services, while encouraging
consumers to drop their xed connection.
The second main result is that the number of customers who subscribe to neither a
xed nor a mobile network increases with the level of the mobile termination rate (The
e¤ect of the xed termination rate is ambiguous). While the simulations conrm the
often-heard claim that higher mobile termination rates increase mobile uptake, they also
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show that the accompanying reduction in the number of customers of the xed network
is larger the pool of non-subscribers increases. As just mentioned, the latter e¤ect is
due to higher xed-to-mobile prices and the resulting lower surplus from holding a xed
connection. Thus, society faces a trade-o¤ between realizing more benets from mobility,
through a larger number of mobile subscriptions, and more connectivity, through a larger
number of consumers who are connected to any network. This and related welfare trade-
o¤s are discussed in the following section.
3.2 Optimal Termination Rates
As shown in the previous section, xed and mobile termination rates have an e¤ect
on subscriber numbers. An important question is then how di¤erent combinations of
termination rates a¤ect di¤erent groups of customers and the rms, and which leads to
the highest welfare. Table 2 shows consumer surplus, prots of mobile operators and
total welfare at equilibrium tari¤s, for the termination rate values of Table 1.
Consumer Surplus Mobile Prots Welfare
anax 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10
0.10 2.86 2.85 2.84 0.201 0.199 0.197 3.26 3.25 3.23
0.19 2.87 2.87 2.87 0.204 0.203 0.201 3.28 3.28 3.27
0.28 2.80 2.80 2.80 0.205 0.203 0.201 3.21 3.21 3.20
0.37 2.79 2.80 2.80 0.207 0.205 0.203 3.20 3.21 3.20
0.46 2.77 2.78 2.78 0.208 0.206 0.204 3.19 3.19 3.19
Table 2: E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and xed (ax) termination rates on
consumer surplus, prots and total welfare.
Clearly, the e¤ects of mobile and xed termination rates are quite di¤erent. Higher
mobile termination rates increase consumer surplus and welfare while they are below a,15
but decrease both when they are above a. The latter occurs because xed-to-mobile calls
have become so expensive that just xed-only customers use them which even weakens
the waterbed e¤ect identied above.
15Using a ne grid of termination rate values it has been veried that this is indeed the case.
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At the same time, mobile operatorsprots continue to increase over the whole range.
Mobile operators thus prefer mobile termination rates above the welfare-maximizing level,
even taking into account the benets frommobility. On the other hand, consumer surplus,
mobile operator prots and welfare are highest with xed termination rates at cost (unless
mobile termination rates are very high), which implies that setting them at cost is both
the right thing to do and uncontroversial.16 While these simulated values are not the
outcome of a calibrated model (and thus should not be taken literally), they indicate
that in the initial phase of the market it was indeed a socially optimal policy to set a
xed termination rate at cost and to allow mobile termination rates signicantly above
marginal cost.
It is also a relevant exercise to decompose consumer surplus into its various compo-
nents, as each customer group should be a¤ected di¤erently. The corresponding simula-
tions results have been collected in Table 3.
Mobile-only Fixed-Mobile Fixed-Only
anax 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10 0.01 0.055 0.10
0.10 1.88 1.82 1.76 2.05 2.08 2.09 0.72 0.77 0.82
0.19 1.95 1.90 1.84 2.03 2.06 2.08 0.72 0.77 0.83
0.28 1.92 1.87 1.81 1.93 1.97 2.00 0.54 0.61 0.67
0.37 1.92 1.87 1.82 1.91 1.96 1.99 0.53 0.61 0.67
0.46 1.91 1.86 1.81 1.88 1.93 1.97 0.53 0.61 0.67
Table 3: E¤ect of the levels of the mobile (a) and xed (ax) termination rates on
surplus of mobile-only, xed-mobile and xed-only customers.
All consumer groups prefer mobile termination rates at or below a, but just mobile-
only customers have a clear preference for a mobile termination rate above cost (actually,
just below a). While the latter clearly prefer cost-based xed termination rates, both
xed-mobile and xed-only customers are in favour of higher levels.
Thus, the interests of customer groups diverge, which may in particular a¤ects those
consumers at the margin of dropping out of the market altogether. This indicates that
the optimal regulatory policy to be adopted in each case may depend on whether for
16Remember that by denition the xed networks prots are zero in this scenario.
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social or other reasons the interests of various customer groups are weighted di¤erently
or not.
4 Conclusions
Mobile telephony has been a tremendous success in the last two decades, making large
inroads into the xed telephony market. Subscribers in many countries now use their
mobiles more than their xed lines, and quite often disconnect the latter. This paper
presented a model that captures the substitution between xed and mobile telephony
at the subscription and call level, by taking into account consumer mobility (i.e., the
fact that consumers are sometimes at home, and sometimes on the road). In a rather
general framework with two competing mobile networks and a regulated xed network,
the paper has shown that call substitution a¤ects retail pricing incentives, in particular
when customer heterogeneity makes it worthwhile to discriminate between customers
with di¤erent substitution possibilities.
Numerical simulations are then used to analyze the e¤ects of xed and mobile termi-
nation rates on the number of xed and mobile users. It is shown that termination rates
do have an e¤ect on subscription substitution and xed disconnection: A higher mobile
(xed) termination rate increases the number of mobile (xed) users and lowers that of
xed (mobile) users, via the waterbed and cost e¤ects, respectively. Higher termination
rates also tend to increase the number of customers who do not adhere to any network,
identifying a trade-o¤ between the uptake of individual networks and total uptake.
Lastly, the analysis indicates that socially optimal xed termination rates tend to
be at cost, which is the level also preferred by both mobile operators and mobile-only
customers (but not xed-mobile and mobile-only customers). On the other hand, socially
optimal mobile termination rates are found above marginal cost, but below the level where
they trigger substitution away from xed-to-mobile calls. Mobile operators prefer rates
clearly above the social optimum, mobile-only customers at the social optimum and the
other consumers prefer rates below the latter. Thus, regulation of mobile termination
rates is justied even taking into account access and call substitution, but interests of
di¤erent customer groups do not coincide.
Future research will contemplate the possibility of bundling among xed and mobile
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services as well as network-based price discrimination and menus of tari¤s.
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Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1: Mobile operator is prots are i = iT1 + mi T2, with
T1 = Fi   f +

m (pi   c)  mj n

qi;
T2 = 
x (pix   co   ax) qix + jnqj + (1  )xnqxm.
The following derivatives are needed, all originating from ki = y
 
wki   wkj

k, for j 6= i
and k 2 fm;mxg:
@mi
@Fi
=  m; @
m
i
@pi
=  mmqi; @
m
i
@pix
=  mxqix;
@mxi
@Fi
=  mx; @
mx
i
@pi
=  mxmqi; @
mx
i
@pix
=  mxxqix:
Thus, one obtains, with  = m + 2mx,
@i
@Fi
=  ; @i
@pi
=  mqi; @i
@pix
=  mxqix;
@mi
@Fi
=  m; @
m
i
@pi
=   (m)2 qi; @
m
i
@pix
=  xqix;
while the derivatives of j and 
m
j are identical apart from having the opposite sign. The
rst-order conditions for maximizing prots i over pi, pix and Fi, can then be written
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as follows, for symmetric i = =2 and 
m
i = 
m=2.17 For Fi, the rst-order condition is
@i
@Fi
=

2
   (T1 + mT2) = 0,
from which one obtains directly
i =
T1 + 
mT2
2
=

4
.
For pi, the rst-order condition is
@i
@pi
=


2

1 +

pi   c  n
2
 q0i
qi

   (T1 + mT2)

mqi = 0.
Combining these two rst-order conditions leads directly to
pi = c+
n
2
.
For pix one obtains
@i
@pix
=

m
2

1 + (pix   co   ax) q
0
ix
qix

    mT1 + T2 xqix
 
m
2
nqi
xqix = 0,
with
 =

m
  
m

> 0,
where the latter inequality follows from  < 1 and m, mx > 0. Combining the conditions
for pix and Fi, and using T1 = Fi   f , leads to the following outcome:
pix = co + ax + n (qix=q
0
ix) 

high;
where

high =
qi + (1  )xqxm
1= (2)  xq2ix=q0ix
17We assume that the corresponding su¢ cient second-order conditions hold.
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Solving the rst-order condition for the xed fee then yields
F i = f +
1
2
  
m

T2
= f +
1
2

1  n
m
high


+
m
2
nqi:
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